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EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH AS AN 
ETIDCAL ISSUE: 
ON THE EMPTINESS OF SYMBOLIC VALUE 
KEVINP. QUINN, SJ., J.D: 
I 
The debate over human embryonic stem cell research-scientific and 
clinical prospects as well as ethical implications-became front-page news 
only after two teams of university researchers reported in November 1998 
that they had isolated and cultured human pluripotent stem cells.' The 
discovery caused a flurry of excitement among patients and researchers and 
drew attention from President Clinton, who instructed the National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) to "conduct a thorough review of 
the issues associated ,vith. .. human stem cell research, balancing all 
medical and ethical issues.,,2 
The allure of stem cells is undeniable. Just listen to the journal 
Science on the promise of "regenerative medicine:") 
Heals all manner of ailments, unlimited quantities, tailor-made for 
you ... No, it's not an advertisement for snake oil but may represent 
the promise of stem cells - cells that have the potential to produce 
various replacements for tissues damaged by age, trauma, or disease.4 
Twenty years' research on embryonic stem (ES) cells, particularly in 
mice, suggests that, as a renewable source of replacement cells and tissue, 
human stem cells could be useful in treating a variety of conditions, 
including Parkinson's and Alzheimer's diseases, diabetes, and spinal cord 
injuries. These cells hold such great promise for advances in health care 
'Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. !979, Fordham University; M.Div. 
1985, S.T.L. 1990, Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley; J.D. 1988. Ph.D. 1993. University of 
California at Berkeley. I wish to thank Sarah Eddy for her valuable research assistance and 
insightful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. 
1. See 1 NAT'L BroEnnCS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETInCAL ISSUES IN HilloL\N STE.\\ CEll 
RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (September 1999) [hereinafter NBAC REPoRT. 
VOL. 1]. 
2 See Letter to President Clinton from the Nat'! Bioethies Ad\isory Comm'n (Sept. 7. 
1999) [hereinafter Letter to President Clinton], quoting Letter to the Nat'! Bioethies Ad\isory 
Comm'n from President Clinton (Nov. 14, 1998). in NBAC REPoRT, VOL I, supra note 1. 
3. Nicholas Wade, Teaching tlte Body to Healltse/f, N.Y. UMES, Nov. 7, 2000, at 01, 
quoting Dr. William Haseltine, ChiefE.xecutive of Human Genome Sciences. 
4. PamelaJ. Hines et aI., Stem Cells Branch Out, 287 SCIENCE 1417 (2000). 
851 
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because they have the potential to grow into any cell in the body and can 
proliferate indefinitely.5 But research on human ES cells did not become 
possible until researchers, using technology developed by specialists at in 
vitro fertilization clinics, managed to isolate them from the blastocyst of an 
early human embryo and keep them growing in a petri dish.6 Scientists 
have also isolated and cultured human embryonic germ (EO) cells, which 
are derived from primordial gonadal tissue obtained from cadaveric fetal 
tissue.7 
The ability to generate a wide variety of stem cell lines (in relatively 
renewable tissue cultures) opens up a whole new world of breathtaking 
possibilities for science and medicine. The possibilities include: "in vitro 
studies of normal embryo-genesis, human gene discovery, and dntg and 
teratogen testing and as a renewable source of cells for tissue 
transplantation, cell replacement, and gene therapies."s But it also opens 
up a world of complications. 
Human EG and ES cells must be recovered from aborted fetuses or 
live embryos. Because primordial gonadal tissue is removed from fetuses 
after their death, the derivation of EO cells from aborted fetuses does not 
cause their death. There are ethical concerns of complicity in the abortion 
itself, but these are not discussed here.9 More important and more relevant 
for our purposes, obtaining stem cells from human embryos inescapably 
kills them. As the New York Times put it: "Where some see destruction of 
life, others see lives being saved."JO 
5. On the science and potential applications of pluripotent stem cells, see I NBAC REpORT, 
supra note 1, at 7; Nat'l Inst. Health, Stem Cells: A Primer, May 2000, at 
http://www.nih.gov/newsistemceWprimer.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2001); see also Nat'l Inst. 
Health, Institutes and Centers, Answers to the Question: "What would you hope to achieve from 
human pluripotent stem cell research?," at http://www.nih.gov/news/stemceIVachieve.htm (lnst 
visited Feb. 13, 2001). 
6. See James A. Thomson et aI., Embryonic Stem Cells Derived from Human Blastocysts, 
282 SCIENCE 1145 (1998). 
7. See Michael J. Shamblott et aI., Derivation of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Cultured 
Human Primordial Germ Cel/s, 95 FRoc. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. USA 13726 (1998), at 
http://www.pnas.org/cgilcontentlfuIV95/231l3726. 
8. NBAC REpORT, YOLo I, supra note 1, at 23. 
9. On the issue of moral complicity in fetal tissue research, see NBAC REpORT, YOL. 1, 
supra note 1, at 45. See also NAT'L INST. HEALTH, REPORT OF THE HUMAN FETAL TISSUE 
TRANSPLANTATION REsEARCH PANEL 1-5 (December 1988). On cooperation and complicity 
with evil in Catholic moral theology, see Daniel C. Maguire, Cooperation with Evil, in 
WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 129 (James F. Childress & John Macquarrie 
eds., 1986); see also M. Cathleen Kaveny, Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation's Mirror image, 
61 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 280 (2000). 
10. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Stem Cell Research Advocates in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 
2001, at All (editors' box summary). 
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Jumping into a now public controversy, the NBAC held stem cell 
meetings around the country and compiled testimony from clerics and 
philosophers, scientists and doctors, lawyers and sociologists. Focusing 
"particular attention on the ethical questions relevant to federal sponsorship 
of research involving [ES] cells and [EO] cells,,,11 the NBAC report, 
Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell Research (submitted in September 
1999), recommended that federally funded stem cell work should go 
fonvard, with important restrictions.12 Only research involving the 
derivation and use of (1) human ES cells from embryos remaining after 
infertility treatments ("spare" embryos) and (2) human EO cells from 
cadaveric fetal tissue should be eligible for federal funding. 13 Judged 
unacceptable for funding is research involving the derivation and use of 
human ES cells from embryos made (1) solely for research purposes using 
IVF (research embryos)'4 or (2) using somatic cell nuclear transfer into 
oocytes.IS 
To permit some federal funding of ES cell research would have 
required a change in current federal law but for a technical legal distinction 
endorsed by the Department of Health and Human Services (OHHS). 
Current law prohibits the National Institutes of Health (NIH) from funding 
the creation of research embryos and research in which embryos are 
destroyed.16 In January 1999, however, DHHS legal counsel issued a 
controversial opinion to the NIH Director ruling that federal funding for 
research with ES cells derived from embryo destruction in the private 
sector (i.e., without federal funds) would be permissible." Last August, 
NIH issued guidelines to govern this research. These guidelines describe in 
detail the scientific and ethical criteria that research proposals must meet to 
receive government funds. IS In brief, publicly funded research on ES cells 
11. Letter to President Clinton, supra note 2. 
12. See NBAC REpORT, VOL. I, supra note I, at 68. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 71. 
15. Id at 72. 
16. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 510(a). 114 Stat. 
2763, 2764 (2000). A sinIilar prohibition has been included in appropriation bills for DHHS 
activities since 1996. See Ellen J. Flannery & Gail H. Javitt, Ana(\'sis oJFcdi:ral Lml"s Pertaining 
to Funding oj Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Research, in 2 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY 
COMM'N, ETHICAL IsSUES IN HUMAN STEM CELL REsEARCH, COMMISSIO}''EO PAPERS 0-1. 0-6 
(January 2000) (citing to official session la\\'s) [hereinafter NBAC REPORT, VOL II] 
17. See Memorandum from Harriet S. Rabb, General Counsel, DHHS. to Harold Varmus, 
M.D., Director, Nlli (Jan. 15, 1999), construed in Flannery & Ja\itt, supra note 17. at 0-6 to D-
9. DIIHS also concluded that federal funding was not prohibited for r<!Search using stem cells 
derived from nonliving fetuses. See id. at 0-3. 
18. See generally Nat'l Insl of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent 
Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976 (Aug. 25, 2000) (corrected by 65 Fed. Reg. 69.951 (Nov. 21. 
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will be allowed so long as researchers obtain the stem cells from privately 
funded sources, and those cells are derived only from "extra" frozen 
embryos left over after infertility treatments. 19 The health institutes are 
soliciting grant applications, with the first submissions due in March 
2001.20 
II 
To permit federally funded research on already established stem cell 
lines derived from spare embryos by privately funded investigators is a 
political and pragmatic solution to "embryo research gridlock.,,21 That 
policy, however, may render the serious moral considerations attributed to 
early human embryos-a view taken by several important official 
bodies22- morally meaningless. Embryos will be treated merely as 
replenishable resources and, in this context, talk of "respect" invoked to 
constrain research is deeply misleading. Bonnie Steinbock is right: "Unless 
we can give a convincing account of 'special respect' [for embryos as a 
form of human life], the suspicion will remain in many minds that this 
phrase merely allows us to kill embryos and not feel so bad about it.,>2) Is 
that the case here? 
One clear starting point in the debate about the ethics and policy of 
stem cell research is the moral status of the early human embryo. There are 
basically three views of this question. One view locates the beginning of 
human personhood, and thus the claim of full moral status, at conception-
the point where one's individual genome is set. Indisputably human, early 
2000», at http://www.nih.gov/newslstemcelllstemcellguidclincs.htm (iast visited Feb. 13, 2001) 
[hereinafter Guidelines]; see also Approval Process for the Documentation of Compliance with 
NIH Guidelines on the Use of Human Pluripotent Stern Cells in NIH Intramural Research, at 
http://www.nih.gov/newslstemcelllirpnotice_01l60I.htm (Jan. 16, 2001) (last visited Feb. 13, 
2001) [hereinafter Approval Process]. 
19. See Guidelines, supra note 18, at 51,979. 
20. See Approval Process, supra note 18. The Bush administration, however, has postponed 
NIH's review of these grant applications until DHHS completes a review of its earlier ruling that 
federal funds could be used to do research on ES cells, but not to derive them. Sec Nicholas 
Wade, Grants for Stem Cell Work are Delayed, N.Y. Times, April 24, 2001, at 
http://www.nytimes.coml2001/04/24lhealthl24STEM.html?searchpv=siteO I. 
21. George J. Annas, How to Utilize Embryos, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 25, 2000, at A21. 
22. See e.g., ETHICS ADVISORY BD, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE [HEW], 
REpORT AND CONCLUSIONS: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO 
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER (May 4, 1979); MARY WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF 
LIFE: THE WARNOCK REpORT ON HUMAN FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (1985); NAT'L 
INST. HEALTH, REpORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL (September 1994) 
[hereinafter HERP REPORT]. 
23. Bonnie Steinbock, Respect for Human Embryos, in CLONING AND TIlE FUTURE OF 
HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH 21, 28 (paul Lauritzen ed., 2001). 
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embryos "have all the rights of any human being, including the right to life 
and the general Kantian right not to be used as a 'mere means' to others' 
ends."24 Those who affirm such a position characteristically oppose 
research on early human embryos as violating the dignity of the embryo. A 
second view holds that as the embryo develops (from blastocyst to fetus 
and beyond) so too does moral status grow (although proponents differ on 
when exactly full moral status is reached). On this understanding, the early 
embryo is vested ,vith negligible moral value and, "[a]s a cluster of 
developing cellular materials, the embryo is an 'object' for medical 
research and manipulation. ,,25 
Were we to grant the unremarkable assertion that we cannot 
determine what the human embryo is, or that "personhood" is a matter of 
definition rather than biological fact, based on socially constricted norms, 
we would still need to capture in some interpretive overlay our intuitive 
sense that a human embryo is, after all, different. To this end, an 
intermediate view on our understanding of the embryo's moral status has 
emerged,26 and the 1994 Nlli Human Embryo Research Panel (HERP) 
Reporf7 is an obvious point of departure. 
The HERP Report identified certain areas of research, including ES 
cell research, as acceptable for federal funding with spare embryos,23 and 
also approved the creation of research embryos when essential to carry out 
research "that is potentially of outstanding scientific and therapeutic 
value."29 These recommendations were never implemented.30 
In concluding that certain areas of research are permissible, the panel 
assessed the moral status of the early embryo from various viewpoints and 
fashioned an intermediate view. According to this view, despite not having 
"the same moral status as an infant or child," the embryo warrants "moral 
respect" or "serious moral consideration as a developing form of human 
life."31 The NBAC Report on stem cell research likewise agrees that 
''human embryos deserve respect as a form of human life."32 
24. Id. at 21. 
25. Courtney S. Campbell, Source or Resource? Human Embryo Research as an Ethical 
Issue, in CLONING AND TIIE FUTURE OF HUMAN Er.ffiRYO REsEARCH 34 (Paul Lauritzen cd., 
2001). 
26. Seeid. 
27. See HERP REPORT, supra note 22. 
28. See id. at xvii. 
29. Id. at xviii. 
30. Since 1996, Congress had blocked use of federal funds for all embryo research. See 
supra note 16 and accompanying text 
31. HERP REPORT, supra note 22, at x. 
32. NBAC REpORT, VOL. 1, supra note 1, at ii. 
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Thus, the intermediate view "claims that research on the human 
embryo is an ethical issue.'m To affirm that the early embryo is worthy of 
moral respect, as Courtney Campbell writes; 
makes research on the embryo an ethical and policy question and not 
only a scientific or technical concern .... The moral claim provides a 
framework for both justification and limitation of embryo research. 
Such research can be justified because of the possible human benefits, 
but it also must be justified and limited in reco~nition of the embryo's 
status of deserving serious moral consideration. 4 
Still, giving meaning to the concept of "serious moral consideration" 
remains problematic. 
"Controversies over embryo research... are primarily fights over 
symbolic issues,,,35 argues John Robertson. In his view, embryos are a 
"potent symbol of human life"36 and for that reason have moral value and 
respect, even though they lack interests, rights, and therefore moral status. 
The distinction here between moral status and moral value-between 
intrinsic and symbolic valuation of the embryo-is important. It shapes 
much of the debate over embryo research and is assumed in the HERP 
Report.37 "[T]o have moral status is to possess interests that exert claims 
on the behavior of others. To accord moral status is to recognize the 
interests of a being as morally obligating.,,38 But to acknowledge the moral 
value of an entity is simply "to talk about its moral significance, which 
stems from its connection with a value that is clearly moral.,,39 In the case 
of an embryo that value is respect for the intrinsic value of life. That is, 
the value of life is "something in and of itself, independent of its results for 
or relations to ourselves or other persons.'>40 
Ronald Dworkin makes a similar distinction. In his effort to redefine 
the national abortion debate and to show what is truly at stake, Dworkin 
distinguishes between "derivative" and "detached" grounds for protecting 
human life.41 The derivative objection to abortion "presupposes and is 
33. Campbell, supra note 25, at 35. 
34. Id at 44-45. 
35. John A. Robertson, Symbolic Issues in Embryo Research, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan. 
- Feb. 1995, at 37. 
36. Id 
37. HERP REPORT, supra note 22, at 35. 
38. Maura A. Ryan, Creating Embryos for Research: On Weighing Symbolic Costs, in 
CLONING AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH 50, 53 (paul Lauritzen cd .• 200 I). 
39. Steinbock, supra note 23, at 29. 
40. John C. Fletcher, Deliberating Incrementally on Human Pluripotential Stem Cell 
Research, in NBAC REpORT, VOL. II, supra note 17, at E-29. 
41. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 11 (1993). 
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derived from rights and interests that it assumes all human beings, 
including fetuses, have.'>42 These rights begin with a right not to be killed. 
On this basis, "government has a derivative responsibility to protect a 
fetus.'>43 The detached objection "does not depend on or presuppose any 
particular rights or interests.'>44 Rather, "abortion is wrong in principle 
because it disregards and insults the intrinsic value, the sacred character, of 
any stage or form of human life because it disregards and insults the 
intrinsic value, the sacred character, of any stage or form of human life.'>45 
On that basis, "government has a detached responsibility for protecting the 
intrinsic value oflife.'>46 
The implications of Dworkin's distinction for embryos and stem cell 
research should be clear: the serious moral consideration due embryos is 
detached (as respecting the intrinsic value of human life) and not derivative 
(as based on their status as rights-holders). Both Robertson and the NBAC 
would concur in this formulation. It does legitimize ethical scrutiny of the 
treatment of the embryo, but the objection may be made: If the vital 
interests of real persons trump over all other moral considerations-the 
benefits of destructive research with embryos always outweigh whatever 
symbolic (or detached) costs arise, is the metric of respect owed embryos 
set too low? Have we fallen into the blunder of achieving medical wonders 
and progress at the expense of humanity? 
III 
The mantra of "respect" invoked to constrain embryo research serves 
to camouflage a distressingly narrow view of things. As my earlier 
comments indicate, I would judge the success of this effort as slight. It is 
important at least to note two major deficiencies that require genuine 
responses rather than enthusiastic apologies from official bodies and 
commentators supporting embryo research. 
One major issue is whether the language of "respect" used by both the 
HERP and the NBAC is "merely a political facade used to disguise and 
make publicly palatable scientific interests in having access to embryos for 
research.'>47 For if any research purposes can justify the destruction of 
embryos, in what sense are they being shown "serious moral 
42. ld. 
43. ld. 
44. ld. 
45. ld. 
46. See DWORKIN, supra note 41. 
47. Campbell, supra note 25, at 40. 
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consideration?" The very idea appears empty. 
Supporters of embryo research counter that "respect is shown ... by 
allowing such research only when good reasons exist for engaging in it and 
an institutional, or even national, review process to assess those reasons has 
been implemented.'>48 As Steinbock explains: Only "research likely to 
result in significant benefit to people. .. demonstrates respect.''''9 This 
approach, in fact, appears as nothing less than an effort to ground public 
research policy in conditional possibilities without providing a moral 
calculus for mediating the claims of research against the "moral weight" of 
the embryo.so Daniel Callahan is right: "Simply projecting possible good 
consequences of research hardly constitutes ... a defense."sl 
The proper "weighing of the symbolic"s2 is a second issue. For 
Robertson and others, what is at stake with the rhetoric of "respect" is 
"about what cost in foregone knowledge should be tolerated to demonstrate 
the respect for human life that limiting embryo research symbolizes.',53 He 
also concedes that marking embryos with "symbolic importance" is an 
effort "to show some deference to those who oppose any embryo 
research.',s4 Note that the symbolic nature of respect functions negatively,55 
and in the end "marginaliz[es] 'symbolic issues' in the development of 
[embryo research] policy."s6 Is this something that should concern us? I 
remain unsettled. 
A worry Maura Ryan advances is important here. She reminds us: 
"Symbols express and shape the deepest levels of human experience, the 
most crucial matters of human society. To overlook or dismiss the 
symbolic is to 'cut ourselves off from what is most important in the life of 
human beings who are, after all, symbol-making animals. ",57 In the case of 
embryo research, marginalizing "the symbolic evades what is really at 
48. John A. Robertson, Ethics and Policy in Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 9 KENNEDY 
INST. ETHICSJ. 109, 131 (1999). 
49. Steinbock, supra note 23, at 30. 
50. See Daniel Callahan, The Puzzle of Profound Respect, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan. -
Feb. 1995, at39. 
51. Daniel Callahan, Letter to the Editor, HASTINGS CENTER REp., May - June 1995, at 5. 
(replying to Hogan and Green's criticism of Callahan's The Puzzle of Profound Respect, supra 
note 50). 
52. Ryan, supra note 38, at 55. 
53. Robertson, Symbolic Issues in Embryo Research, supra note 35, at 37. 
54. Robertson, Ethics and Policy in Embryonic Stem Cell Research, supra notc 48, at 120. 
55. See James Keenan, S.J., Casuistry, Virtue, and the Slippery Slope: Major Problems with 
Producing Human Embryonic Life for Research Purposes, in CLONING AND TIlE FUTURE OF 
HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH 67, 76 (paul Lauritzen ed., 2001). 
56. See Ryan, supra note 38, at 51. 
57. Id at 55, quoting GILBERT C. MEILAENDER, BODY, SOUL AND BIOETHICS 87 (1995). 
HeinOnline -- 13 St. Thom. L. Rev. 859 2000-2001
2001] EJvfBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH 859 
stake in conflicts over where to draw the line."ss As Ryan suggests, this is 
a serious mistake. 
In sum, the sincerity of the commitment to respect human embryos is 
inauthentic and the adequacy of the criteria used in weighing competing 
values is suspect. Research needs inevitably take precedence over the 
respect due embryos. Must this always be the case? To answer, we must 
first resuscitate the question of what it means to respect human embryos. 
IV 
Even when there is agreement that the early embryo, though not 
morally comparable to a person \vith rights, has moral value and respect, to 
approximate a true metric of this respect remains a vexing issue. Yet, as 
we engage the human embryo-deriving and using stem cells from spare, 
research, or cloned59 early embryos-the matter of its status is unavoidable. 
For now, what is important is how to open up public discussion, to expand 
the range of what is taken to be morally important, and to ask what is the 
early embryo's proper station in the moral universe. 
There is a necessary place in public debate for perspectives that 
challenge the dominant view on our understanding of the embryo's moral 
status. The limits of this essay permit me to frame only one. To 
"reverence" rather than to ''value'' early embryos is a more intuitively 
appealing paradigm.60 The attitude of reverence is one not of evaluation 
but of deference. For the human embryo itself matters, not what goes into 
it.61 A better way of measuring the intrinsic worth of the early embryo is to 
58. Ryan, supra note 38, at 55. 
59. In Januruy 2001, the British House of Lords approved new legislation permitting 
''therapeutic cloning"-the cloning of human embryos for research, but not for reproductive, 
purposes. The measures will allow researchers to derive and use embryonic stem cells from 
cloned embryos up to fourteen days old. See Lords Support Embryo Cloning Research, at 
http://www.bbc.co.uklhilenglishfsciftechfnewsid Oast \isited Feb. 13, 2001). The NBAC had 
earlier judged this option unacceptable for federal funding. Sec NBAC REPORT, VOL. I, supra 
note 1, at 72. 
60. The notion of "reverence" is from Richard Stith, On Death and Dworkin: A Critique of 
His Theory of Inviolability, 56 MD. L. REV. 289 (1997). Stith's article focuses on Dworkin's 
pivotal idea in Life'S Dominion, DWORKIN, supra note 41: "the inviolability of human life is a 
function of the value of the creative efforts invested in it Arguing that this notion is both 
unfortunate and erroneous, [Stith] proposes an alternative understanding of life's inviolability, 
one founded on respect for the human image or form." Stith, at 292-93. To rcspl:Ct or reverence 
life "is an entirely separate stance, unrelated to value," id. at 297, and a better way, both 
descriptively and normatively, of measuring the sanctity of prenatal life. Sec id at 347-58. 
61. In saying that human life is not something added to, 1 mean to rejcct DworkIn's 
investment-based theory of inviolability-'The life of a single human organism commands 
respect and protection, then, no matter in what form or shape, because of the comple.'< creative 
investment [both natural and human] it represents ... " DWORKIN, supra note 41, at 84. On this 
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look at the wonder it elicits. Where value-language invites inegalitarian 
judgments of comparative value-to evaluate and so to devalue those 
embryos we might destroy, reverence-language ensures that embryos are 
seen as quasi-subjects that lay a claim on us rather than objects for 
manipulation. Put within a perspective of reverence, "the embryo is a life 
source before it is a research resource. . . . Thus, ethical justification is 
required of scientific proposals to transform the embryo's status to that of 
resource.,,62 Affording the embryo's symbolic worth real bite, this view 
meets the challenge63 of more properly weighing the symbolic in embryo 
research. Reverence does not require ( embryonic) preservation at all costs, 
but it does raise the bar. 
At a minimum, an ethic that demands reverence for human embryonic 
life will require that other, less morally controversial alternatives, such as 
the use of adult stem cells,64 be explored first. Courtney Campbell labels 
this "a criterion of 'last resort' with respect to human embryos. [Embryos] 
should not be a first or intermediate resort simply because they can be 
easily obtained, are more scientifically interesting, or are a means to 
winning a research race within the scientific community.,,6s Reverence for 
embryos as a form of human life does not rule out using embryos in 
important research, yet creating research embryos is different, in a moral 
sense, than the experimental use of spare embryos and is deeply troubling 
under this ethic. It insults our communal sense of reverence. In terms of 
how embryos may ethically be used, "[a]we, wonder, and experience of 
mystery need to stand behind and permeate ongoing research .... "66 With 
an attitude of reverence is a better way, I submit, to proceed with embryo 
research. 
v 
Always eloquent Ronald Dworkin reminds us: "The greatest insult to 
see Stith, supra note 60, at 328-47 (critiquing Dworkin's theory). 
62. Campbell, supra note 25, at 47. 
63. On the nature of the challenge, see Ryan, supra note 38, 53-4 and accompanying text. 
64. Research with stem cells obtained from children and adults, e.g., blood stem cells, would 
not require the destruction of human embryos. While a consensus in the scientific community 
insists "because important biological differences exist between embryonic and adult stem cells, 
this source of stem cells should not be considered an alternative to ES and EO cell research," I 
NBAC REpORT, supra note 1, at ii, some researchers dissent. See, e.g., Do No Harm: The 
Coalition of Americans for Research Ethics (reporting advances in adult stem cell research and 
arguing for the moral significance of that research alternative), a/ 
http://www.stemcellresearch.orglindex.html(last visited Feb. 13, 2001). On the current science 
of adult stem cells, see Nat'l Inst. Health, Stem Cells: A Primer, supra note 6, at 4-5. 
65. Campbell, supra note 25, at 48. 
66. ld at 46. 
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the sanctity of life is indifference or laziness in the face of its 
complexity."67 The rhetoric of therapeutic medicine on the prospects of 
stem cell research is strong and unequivocal. Rather than paying lip 
service to the idea of respect for embryos, we need to accommodate a fuller 
and thicker picture of the embryo, to respond to the deep moral reservations 
about embryo research held by many Americans, and to shift the paradigm 
for public discussion on such research. In short, we need to give serious 
"recognition to the fundamental wonder of [human] life itself,'tt>S and so to 
escape the charge of moral indifference. 
67. DWORKIN, supra note 41, at 240. 
68. Campbell, supra note 25, at 46. 
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